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As the Department of Defense continues to face force and budget reductions, the 
Army must rise to the occasion and explore opportunities that will improve its level of 
wartime readiness within resource constraints. Senior Army leadership realized that one 
area needing substantial changes was the Army's maintenance procedures. 
This thesis examines the Army's Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) 
program. As with any program, there is a certain amount of managerial control necessary 
to implement and execute the program. The primary focus of this thesis is to identify 
what agencies, within the Army, are capable of providing the centralized management of 
ISM at the national level and what functions/responsibilities the National Sustainment 
Maintenance Manager (NSMM) should perform. 
ISM allows centralized management and decentralized execution of the Army's 
sustainment maintenance requirements through the consolidation of all sustainment 
maintenance activities under an integrated management structure. The goal of the 
concept is to maximize repair capabilities while providing high levels of operational 
availability for assigned weapon systems at a reduced cost. By balancing resource 
allocations, workload distributions, and decentralizing the execution of sustainment 
maintenance, ISM seeks to maximize repair capabilities and optimize the use of available 
resources. 
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A. AREA OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will examine the United States Army's Integrated Sustainment 
Maintenance (ISM) program. As with any program, there is a certain amount of 
managerial control necessary to implement and execute the program. The primary focus 
of this thesis is to determine what agency, within the Army, should provide the 
centralized management of ISM at the national level and what are this agency's functions 
and responsibilities. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Army's maintenance system, for the most part, consists of four separate levels 
(See Table 1-1). Each level serves a specific purpose within the overall system. The 
only deviations from the four-level maintenance system are found in the aviation 
maintenance community and for certain low density, high-tech items. 
Levels of Maintenance Primary Responsibility 
Organizational - Preventive maintenance, checks, and services 
- Minor adjustments 
- Replacement of piece parts 
Direct Support (DS) - Diagnose and isolate equipment, component, and assemblies 
malfunctions 
- Repair defective end items 
General Support (GS) - Diagnose and isolate equipment, component, and assemblies 
malfunctions to the internal piece part level 
- Repair/modification of end items, component, and assemblies to 
the internal piece part level 
Depot - Overhaul of end items, components, and assemblies requiring 
manufacturer's tolerances 
Table 1-1. Categories of Maintenance [Ref. 1, pp. 2-4 and 2-5] 
All maintenance conducted above the DS level is referred to as sustainment 
maintenance. Within the Army, there are a wide variety of units/organizations that 
perform sustainment maintenance. The following list identifies the common sustainment 
maintenance providers: 
• Active component GS maintenance units. 
• Reserve component (both National Guard and Army Reserve) GS maintenance 
units. 
• Non-divisional aviation intermediate maintenance (AVIM) units. 
• Installation Directorate of Logistics (DOL) maintenance activities. 
• Depots and National-level maintenance management activities operated by the 
Army Materiel Command (AMC). 
• Specialized Repair Activities (SRA). * 
• Forward Repair Activities (FRA). * 
• Department of the Army contractors. * 
• NOTE: These activities perform sustainment maintenance for specialized 
equipment or under unique conditions. [Ref. 2, p. 1-1] 
C.       THE EVOLUTION OF ISM 
As the Department of Defense continues to face force and budget reductions, the 
Army must rise to the occasion and explore opportunities that will, subject to resource 
constraints, improve its level of wartime readiness. Senior Army leadership realized that 
one area that needed substantial changes was the Army's maintenance procedures. The 
U. S. Army Strategic Logistics Agency (SLA), a staff support agency of the Office of the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (ODCSLOG), was assigned the mission to develop a 
streamlined sustainment maintenance (all maintenance conducted above the Direct 
Support level) system for the Army. SLA established a task force to develop this 
futuristic maintenance concept. The task force coordinated with numerous staffs and 
commands throughout the Army. They also studied current and emerging Army doctrine 
as well as the lessons-learned from Operation Desert Shield/Storm. Their 
recommendation was to create the ISM concept. 
ISM allows centralized management and decentralized execution of the Army's 
sustainment maintenance requirements through the consolidation of all sustainment 
maintenance activities under an integrated management structure. The goal of the 
concept is to maximize repair capabilities while providing, at a reduced cost, high levels 
of operational availability for assigned weapon systems. By balancing resource 
allocations, workload distributions, and decentralizing the execution of sustainment 
maintenance, ISM seeks to maximize repair capabilities and optimize the use of 
available resources. The management for the concept will be executed at three levels: 
local, regional, and national. 
Local Sustainment Maintenance Managers (LSMMs) have the responsibility to 
workload all Army sustainment maintenance activities within their local area 
(installation). The LSMMs will develop a reparable program consisting of authorized 
reparable components which satisfy one of the following criteria: (1) the reparable is a 
locally demanded readiness driver, (2) the reparable is a cost-effective repair, or (3) the 
reparable provides essential training for sustainment maintenance personnel. Once 
developed, this information is sent to a regional manager for consolidation with other 
local reparable programs. Upon approval, the LSMMs would be responsible for the 
execution of the local program. Any maintenance requirements beyond the capability of 
the local activities would be elevated to the region for redistribution. 
Regional Sustainment Maintenance Managers (RSMMs), located at designated 
geographic areas, would have the authority to prioritize and/or redistribute workloads 
among the LSMMs. The local reparable programs submitted to the RSMMs will be 
tailored to meet weapon system availability requirements, cost avoidance goals, and 
regional training requirements. The RSMMs would establish regional reparable 
programs to support regional requirements not included in any local reparable program. 
This should enhance the readiness of low-density equipment items which, when 
consolidated at the regional levels, would justify a reparable program. The RSMMs are 
responsible for managing any shortcomings in the LSMMs capability/capacity by cross- 
leveling assets between local areas, reassigning workloads, or passing shortfalls to the 
national level. 
A National Sustainment Maintenance Manager (NSMM) is responsible for 
integrating all sustainment maintenance for the Army, both in peacetime and in wartime. 
At the national level, wholesale requirements for reparable items can be determined. 
With visibility of regional/local reparable programs, the item managers located at 
National Inventory Control Points (NICPs) can better manage their assigned 
commodities. The item managers would be able to make intelligent repair/buy decisions. 
This will enable better utilization of assets, reduce unnecessary procurements of new 
items, and maximize cost avoidance. [Ref. 2, pp. 1-2 and 1-3] 
D.       INITIAL TESTING OF THE ISM CONCEPT 
Under the control of SLA, an ISM Proof of Principle (PoP) was conducted at 
several U. S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) installations from 1 November 1993 
to 31 July 1994. A geographical region for the ISM PoP was established that consisted of 
the following locations: Fort Carson, Colorado; Fort Riley, Kansas; and Fort Hood, 
Texas. [Ref. 2, p. 1-3] Each of these installations was already operating separate 
reparable programs (See Table 1-2 and Figure 1-1). Of the total 695 national stock 
numbers (NSNs) being repaired within the region, only 67 NSNs were being repaired by 
all three installations. Of the remaining NSNs, 92 were common to two of the three 
installations, and 536 were being repaired at a single location. [Ref. 3, pp. 29-30] 
Installation # of Reparables 
Fort Carson 177 
Fort Hood 405 
Fort Riley 339 
Table 1-2. Installation Reparable Programs 
/ Fort Carson / 46\ Fort Riley \ 
\    53      X 
\67/ 
191    J 
\        /   11 35 
Fort Hood 
292 
Figure 1-1. NSN Distribution by Installation 
The staff of personnel assembled to conduct the management of the PoP came 
from various organizations and locations. The LSMMs were drawn from the DOL 
maintenance staffs from the three participating installations. Augmented by contractor 
personnel, the LSMMs were given the responsibility for managing the sustainment 
maintenance workload within their local area. An officer from the 4th Corps Material 
Management Center (CMMC), 13th Corps Support Command (COSCOM), Fort Hood, 
served as the RSMM. Augmented by contractor personnel, the RSMM prioritized and 
managed the sustainment maintenance within the region. Personnel from the Depot 
Systems Command (DESCOM), an AMC major subordinate command, were collocated 
at the local and regional offices. The DESCOM representatives provided an interface to 
the national level. SLA operated a command and control cell at Fort Hood to monitor the 
PoP, resolve problems, and provide guidance. [Ref. 2, p. 1-3] 
In order to assist in the management of the sustainment maintenance functions 
occurring within the region, an automated system had to be employed. SLA selected a 
commercially-designed, prototype, Executive Management Information System (EMIS) 
for the task. The system was developed by the Computer Systems Development 
Corporation. The RSMM and the three LSMMs all had access to the EMS. The system 
provided the maintenance managers with information on maintenance forecasting, 
workload management, exception management, repair cycle times, and other 
maintenance-related information. The EMIS was capable of uploading data from the 
Army's current and emerging logistics management and information systems. [Ref. 2, p. 
1-4] 
Once the critical personnel positions were filled, the managers began to analyze 
the regional reparable workload. Their initial objective was to make recommendations 
for reducing inefficiencies and consolidating sustainment maintenance repairs within the 
region. To accomplish this task, the managers utilized another unique ISM feature - a 
standardized maintenance costing method. This new methodology allows the full cost 
(direct labor costs, indirect labor costs, and general and administrative expenses) of 
sustainment maintenance to be captured regardless of what types of organizations are 
performing the repairs. 
The full-costing methodology provided a framework for comparing the actual 
repair costs of the reparable candidates to be repaired at regional centers of excellence 
(COEs) during the PoP. Each COE repaired items for customers on their own 
installation, plus would receive, repair, and return reparables to other PoP-participating 
installations. The RSMM and the LSMMs selected over 130 reparable NSNs as possible 
candidates for the program. 
After utilizing various selection factors, the 130 candidate NSNs were screened 
down to 65 NSNs for repair at the regional COEs. The initial assignment of NSNs to 
certain COEs had to be slightly modified to adjust for work center capabilities and 
capacities. Once approval was received from the commanders of the three installations, 
the following workloads were assigned: Fort Carson served as the COE for 18 NSNs, 
Fort Hood was the COE for 34 NSNs, and Fort Riley as the COE for 13 NSNs. [Ref. 3, 
P. 31] 
The cost avoidance that was achieved during the ISM PoP was quite encouraging. 
For the 65 NSNs selected for the initial test, an annual cost avoidance of $4.4 million 
was forecasted. Since the PoP was scheduled for only a nine month period rather than a 
full 12 months, the forecasted savings would be $3.3 million. Using the full-cost 
methodology, the actual cost avoidance realized during the PoP was $2.3 million. The 
$1.0 million shortfall between the forecasted cost avoidance and the actual savings was 
attributed to three factors: (1) the production throughout the region was slow to start, (2) 
the supply system was not integrated into the ISM concept, and (3) the cost of some of 
the repair parts utilized in the sustainment maintenance changed during the period. [Ref. 
4, pp. 17-18] 
In addition to the repairs being conducted on the regional items, SLA asked the 
U. S. Army Tank and Automotive Command (TACOM) to submit reparable components 
to the RSMM from the national level. These items do not belong to any specific 
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installation. They are inventory that supports the wholesale supply system within the 
Army. Typically, these reparables are overhauled at Army depots, civilian contractors, or 
replaced by new procurements. Tables 1-3 and 1-4 illustrate TACOMs cost avoidance 
by participating in the ISM PoP. [Ref. 5] 
E.       ISM-X DEMONSTRATION 
Currently, the Army is conducting a second round of ISM. This phase, which will 
run from 1 April to 31 December 1995, is called Integrated Sustainment Maintenance 
Expanded (ISM-X). The ISM-X demonstration will utilize the same regional reparable 
structure that was established with ISM PoP. The RSMM will be based at Fort Hood 
again; however, there are some additional participants involved with ISM-X. The 
installations/activities that are participating are listed in Table 1-5. In addition to the 
increased number of installations involved, the number of reparable NSNs has increased 
from 65 lines (ISM PoP) to 187 lines (ISM-X). [Ref. 6] 
Item 
Name 








Winch 2.5 T truck 55 Riley $27,883 $137,500 $109,617 
Winch 2.5 T truck 200 Hood 93,834 500,000 406,166 
Transmsn HMMWV 47 Riley 30,112 51,606 21,494 
Transmsn HMMWV 213 Riley 133,606 233,874 100,268 
Starter M88A1 162 Riley 33,000 57,222 24,222 
Starter M88A1 66 Riley 14,067 23,313 9,246 
Starter M88A1 1,300 Riley 403,193 539,812 136,619 
Engine HEMTT 75 Hood 495,456 1,312,457 817,001 
Engine HEMTT 145 Hood 958,635 2,537,417 1,578,782 
Engine HEMTT 137 Hood 907,731 2,397,422 1,489,691 
Engine HMMWV 100 Riley 163,500 381,900 218,400 
Engine HMMWV 100 Riley 160,797 381,900 221,103 
Engine CUCV 100 Carson 191,554 475,400 283,846 
Radiator HEMTT 5 Hood 3,344 6,704 3,360 
Engine M939A2 40 Riley 124,532 527,920 403,388 
Engine M9ACE 9 Riley 54,279 192,609 138,330 
Transfer 2.5 T truck 55 Hood 83,806 110,718 26,913 
Total 2,809 $3,879,329 $9,867,774 $5,988,445 
Transfer 2.5 T truck 173 Hood 171,215 * * 
Transfer 2.5 T truck 180 Hood 159,005 * * 
Cyl Head M113 112 Hood 27,450 * * 
Total 3,274 $4,236,999 
Table 1-3. ISM Cost Avoidance Based On Depot Overhaul Costs 












Winch 2.5 T truck 55 Riley $27,883 $88,263 $60,381 
Winch 2.5 T truck 200 Hood 93,834 320,958 227,124 
Transmsn HMMWV 47 Riley 30,112 79,291 49,179 
Transmsn HMMWV 213 Riley 133,606 359,342 225,735 
Starter M88A1 162 Riley 33,000 76,372 43,372 
Starter M88A1 66 Riley 14,067 31,114 17,048 
Starter M88A1 1,300 Riley 403,193 612,729 209,536 
Engine HEMTT 75 Hood 495,456 1,995,407 1,499,951 
Engine HEMTT 145 Hood 958,635 3,857,787 2,899,152 
Engine HEMTT 137 Hood 907,731 3,644,944 2,737,213 
Engine HMMWV 100 Riley 163,500 418,019 254,519 
Engine HMMWV 100 Riley 160,797 418,019 257,222 
Engine CUCV 100 Carson 191,554 579,983 388,429 
Radiator HEMTT 5 Hood 3,344 5,375 2,031 
Engine M939A2 40 Riley 124,532 565,076 440,544 
Engine M9ACE 9 Riley 54,279 317,280 263,001 
Transfer 2.5 T truck 55 Hood 83,806 99,715 15,909 
Transfer 2.5 T truck 173 Hood 171,215 313,649 142,434 
Transfer 2.5 T truck 180 Hood 159,005 326,340 167,335 
CylHead M113 112 Hood 27,450 55,724 28,275 
Total 3,274 $4,236,999 $14,420,170 $10,126,929 
Table 1-4. ISM Cost Avoidance Based On New Procurements 
NOTES: Totals have been rounded. 
Replacement Price = Cost to procure new assets. 
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Installation/Organization Major Army Command (MACOM) 
Fort Bliss, Texas U. S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) 
Fort Carson, Colorado FORSCOM 
Fort Hood, Texas FORSCOM 
Fort Riley, Kansas FORSCOM 
Fort Sill, Oklahoma TRADOC 
Kansas National Guard NGB 
Texas National Guard NGB 
Table 1-5. ISM-X Participants 
In addition to the Fort Hood-based region covering the central portion of the 
United States, the Army is developing a second region for the east coast. The eastern 
region will consist of the following FORSCOM installations: Fort Bragg, North Carolina 
(also serving as the RSMMs location); Fort Cambell, Kentucky; Fort Drum, New York; 
Fort Polk, Louisiana; and Fort Stewart, Georgia. By incorporating the lessons-learned for 
the central region, the eastern region plans to be operational by the first quarter of fiscal 
year 96. [Ref. 7] 
F.       CONCLUSION 
As illustrated in this chapter, ISM is a revolutionary new method for the Army to 
perform its sustainment maintenance. Although the concept has not fully matured or has 
not been totally accepted by the senior Army leadership as to date, the ISM program has 
already proven itself as a likely approach for future Army maintenance requirements. 
The following chapter will address the importance of implementing the ISM concept. 
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H. IMPORTANCE OF ISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As the testing/analysis of the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) concept 
proceeds, additional benefits to the Army continue to be realized. In addition to these 
apparent advantages to the Army's maintenance system, several other factors indicate that 
ISM needs to be implemented. The issues that exist in today's Army environment are 
ones of revolutionary new doctrine/strategies, of a need for improved wartime readiness, 
and of a reduced budget. 
B. DOCTRINE AND STRATEGIES 
The innovative doctrine and strategies prevelent in today's military are a by- 
product of the conclusion of the Cold War. 
In 1991, in response to the rapid, significant changes in both the 
international and domestic environments, the President published a new 
National Security Strategy for the United States. Shortly thereafter, the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, published the new National Military 
Strategy. Those two landmark documents, responding fundamentally to 
the changing threat and dramatic budget reductions, altered the structural 
and operational paradigms of all DoD components. [Ref. 8, p. 2-1 ] 
1.        National Military Strategy 
In the 1995 edition of the National Military Strategy, General John M. 
Shalikashvili explains that "our Armed Forces are engaged worldwide on a continual 
basis to accomplish two national military objectives - promoting stability (through 
regional cooperation and constructive interaction) and thwarting aggression (through 
credible deterrence and robust warfighting capabilities)." In order to accomplish these 
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two objectives, he identifies a strategy consisting of three tasks that our military forces 
must perform. The tasks are: 
• Peacetime engagement. 
• Deterrence and conflict prevention. 
• Fighting and winning our Nation's wars. 
Furthermore, achieving these "tasks of the strategy is facilitated by the two 
complementary strategic concepts ofoverseas presence and power projection." [Ref. 9, 
Pi] 
Overseas presence includes "both permanently stationed forces and temporarily 
deployed forces abroad." This presence, which includes "routine air, ground, naval 
deployments, various contingency operations, and global prepositioning of equipment," 
helps maintain crucial infrastructure available and prepared for times of conflict. [Ref. 
9,p.ii] 
With less military power stationed overseas than in the past, the U. S. must 
increase our ability to project power abroad. General Shalikashvili states that, "credible 
power projection capability complements our overseas presence in acting as a deterrent 
to potential adversaries." These capabilities also give us greater flexibility in engaging 
military forces. [Ref. 9, p. 7] 
2.        Operations 
In 1993, the United States Army drastically changed its operational doctrine 
(Field Manual 100-5) from the AirLandBattle concept to what is now called Operations. 
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This new doctrine, which is based on the National Security Strategy and the National 
Military Strategy from the President and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is 
designed to carry the Army into the 21st century. The primary differences between the 
two doctrines are shown in Table 2-1. 
Airland Battle (1976, '82,& '86) Operations (1993) 
• Forward - Deployed • CONUS - Based 
• European - Focused # Globally - Focused 
• Prepared for Global War with Soviet 
Union 
• Prepared for Regional Contingencies 
Table 2-1. Doctrinal Comparison [Ref. 10] 
Field Manual (FM) 100-5 reflects the use of the classical principles of war, the 
dynamics of combat power, and the organization of today's warfare. Future conflicts, as 
demonstrated in Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS), will be fought from a three- 
dimensional (width, depth, and height) standpoint with highly technical forces on a 
nonlinear battlefield. [Ref. 11, p. 9] 
3.        Changing the Azimuth on Logistics 
Due to the doctrinal and strategic transitions that have occurred in the last five 
years, Army logisticians have responded in a totally new direction. This new azimuth is 
targeted toward a concept called Force XXI. The Force XXI doctrine focuses on the 
enormous strategic mobility, distribution, and sustainment challenges that accompany the 
evolving operational doctrine and military strategy. The march to Force XXI is divided 
into three phases: near term (1994-1996), mid-term (2002), and long term (2020). 
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The near term will involve introducing numerous new concepts within the 
Army's logistical system. The characteristics of Force XXI include: 
• Battle command based on real-time, shared, simultaneous, situational 
awareness. 
• Digitally linked/networked organizations. 
• Modular force structure with the flexibility to be designed for a specific 
capability rather than a particular threat. 
• Seamless logistics. 
• Digitization with information-age technology. 
During the mid-term phase, the Army plans to introduce several new force 
structures (Brigade 96, Division 97, and Corps 99) and complete the implementation of 
the Power Projection Logistics initiatives started in the early 1990's. Several of these 
initiatives include the Army's Strategic Mobility Program (ASMP), afloat prepositioned 
maintenance facilities, and Total Asset Visibility (TAV). [Ref. 8, p. 2-1] 
The final phase will involve introducing Battlespace Logistics. The goal of 
Battlespace Logistics is to have a logistics system that is deployable for wartime, yet 
suitable in peacetime. The primary characteristics of Battlespace Logistics are: 
• Single logistical system with a national provider for the entire Army. 
• Intelligent, value-added, networked system electronically linked and operating 
in real time. 
• Asset visibility throughout the system. 
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• Fully synchronized and compatible for all Army forces (active and reserve 
components, as well as for combat arms, combat support, and combat service 
support units), yet capable of operating under joint/combined environments. 
• Cost effective, transparent to the user, and a nonhierarchical structure 
consisting of multifunctional components. [Ref. 8, p. 3-5] 
The Army needs a flexible, responsive maintenance concept to support future 
operations. ISM is one of several initiatives that senior Army logisticians are studying in 
preparation for the 21st century as part of Force XXI. [Ref. 12, p. 4] 
C.       WARTIME READINESS 
Due to the overwhelming success that the coalition forces experienced in ODS 
and the lack of a major threat to our security from a hostile nation, many believe that the 
DoD, and the Army in particular, has little to be concerned about in future conflicts. 
However, there are numerous factors that show otherwise. Lessons-leamed from ODS, 
problems with the Army's current sustainment maintenance structure, and shortcomings 
with the existing active component/reserve component (AC/RC) relationship, all serve as 
warnings to wartime readiness deficiencies. 
1.        Equipment Readiness 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) has raised a concern that the weakest link 
in the military's logistics chain is the sustainability of deployed systems in an extended 
conflict. During ODS, the Army increased its estimated operating requirements for 
repair parts by as much as five times the pre-ODS usage rate. The increase was 
attributed to the increased operating tempo (optempo), the harsh desert environment in 
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Southwest Asia (SWA), and a lack of visibility of repair parts once they arrived in the 
theater. Based on these increased usage rates of critical items, GAO expected the Army's 
inventory to be exhausted within the first 30 days of conflict. [Ref. 13, p. 4] 
The Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) estimated a threefold increase in the 
spare parts usage rate over the normal usage rate; the Aviation Systems Command 
(AVSCOM) projected a fivefold increase. These Commands, in conjunction with 
commanders in SWA, identified the critical readiness drivers for the Army's ground and 
air combat systems. Based on the on-hand balance and due-in supply status, these 
officials estimated what additional stocks would be required for various optempos. 
Table 2-2 shows the seriousness of the estimated repair parts shortages. 
EQUIPMENT <30 DOS <60 DOS <90 DOS 
Air (AH-64, CH-47, OH-58, & UH-60) 5-30* 13-44* 15-49* 
Ground (MlAl, M60, & M2/3) 64 71 N/A 
Table 2-2. Percentage of Critical Items with less than 30/60/90 Days of Supply (DOS) 
* Range for Air Equipment is due to various optempos. 
In an attempt to overcome the shortages of repair parts for these critical systems, 
the Commands pursued several logistical initiatives. Some of these actions included: 
• Expanding existing repair programs. 
• Establishing new repair programs. 
• Expediting contract awards. 
• Accelerating deliveries of existing contracts. 
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In some cases, these initiatives helped improve the readiness of these systems. In other 
instances, these actions did not improve the inventory situation until after the on-hand 
balances were exhausted. For example, 
On January 26,1991, the Tank-Automotive Command had no 
Bradley 500-horsepower engines on hand and had back orders for 107 
engines, including 53 for Operation Desert Storm. The Command 
estimated that it would need 50 engines a month to meet Operation Desert 
Storm requirements. On the basis of the Command's estimate of the 
number of engines it could expect to receive from repair facilities, it 
projected that demands could not be met until sometime in April 1991. 
[Ref. 13, pp. 39-40] 
AVSCOM increased its repair capabilities for 1,200 depot repair programs and 
established 589 new programs. These initiatives (by both TACOM and AVSCOM), to 
satisfy the ODS requirements for fiscal year 1991, cost the Army an estimated $197 
million. [Ref. 13, p. 33] 
2.        Sustainment Maintenance Personnel 
Operation Desert Shield/Storm revealed another weakness in the Army's 
sustainment maintenance strategy. In peacetime, the majority of the general support 
(GS) maintenance is conducted by Directorate of Logistics (DOL) activities. These 
activities are predominately staffed by civilian employees rather than Army soldiers and 
are considered an installation organization. As a result, they do not deploy in support of 
conflicts. However, the Army's current sustainment maintenance strategy relies on 
military units to perform the necessary GS repairs. Additionally, a significant portion 
(about 86%) of the Army's deployable GS assets are from the National Guard (NG) and 
United States Army Reserve (USAR) rather than the AC. 
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The Army's strategy (as outlined in operational plans, training and doctrine 
publications, and maintenance policy regulations) to accomplish its critical sustainment 
maintenance mission calls for Army soldiers, both active and reserve, to perform it. 
However, these soldiers, whose mission is vital to sustaining the combat forces in a 
protracted conflict, are not sufficiently trained for their duties. This lack of training is 
particularly prevalent in the reserve component units because: 
• Reserve units are sometimes located a great distance from maintenance sites 
or other repair facilities. 
• The reserve soldiers only have about 39 days annually to meet all training 
requirements. 
• Weekend training time is frequently spent on administrative tasks. 
• Often, the effort is not put forth to integrate RC units with compatible active 
units to provide a quality two-week annual training period. 
• Most RC units have earlier generation equipment/weapon systems than the 
equipment they are expected to maintain when activated. 
• The NG/USAR units often lack the needed tools/equipment to repair the newer 
combat equipment fielded within the AC. [Ref. 14, pp. 2-4] 
The lack of adequate training of soldiers in sustainment maintenance exists in the 
AC as well as the RC. Studies have shown that many active duty GS maintenance 
companies are not repairing the modern, higher priority systems, referred to as force 
modernization equipment, that populate today's battlefields. Investigators found that due 
to "insufficient training, experience, tools, and test equipment, they (GS maintenance 
units) were repairing older, lower priority equipment and, in some cases, were primarily 
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repairing obsolete and/or displaced equipment." Table 2-3 illustrates that for the Army's 
force modernization equipment, the majority of the repairs are being done by DOL 
personnel rather than soldiers. Several of the units were not even performing GS 
maintenance at all. Instead, they were performing direct support (DS) maintenance, 
which is a lower level of maintenance. 
Equipment   /   Installation FT Riley FT Hood FT Polk PT Sill FTKnox 
SOLDIERS 556th 190th 539th 225th 76th 
Ml Tanks No No No No No 
M2/3 Bradleys No No No No No 
HEMTT* No No No No No 
CIVILIANS DOL DOL DOL DOL DOL 
Ml Tanks Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
M2/3 Bradleys Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
HEMTT* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table2-3. Peacetime« 3S Mainten ance Work oads [Ref. 15, pp. 15-20] 
NOTES: All units identified are Heavy Equipment Maintenance Companies (HEMCO). 
* Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT). 
During ODS, most of the GS maintenance companies that deployed were 
assigned tasks other than their designated mission. Only one of eight companies 
performed GS maintenance while deployed (see Table 2-4). Army officials stated that 
this was due to many of these units arriving in SWA later than expected and that they 
lacked the spare parts and tools required to perform GS maintenance. Had these units 
been performing the correct level of maintenance on the correct equipment in peacetime, 
they would have been better prepared to execute their wartime mission when needed. 
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GS Units Assigned Tasks 
76th HEMCO Vehicle washing and cannibalization point 
190th HEMCO Cannibalization point and various details, such as mail delivery 
647th LEMCO Vehicle washing and other tasks, such as guard duty 
556th HEMCO Combat equipment turn-in site 
170th HEMCO Vehicle washing and preparing vehicles to return to the U. S. 
344th HEMCO Cannibalization point, technical inspections, and equipment recovery 
900th HEMCO Vehicle and component repair and retrograde * 
238th HEMCO Equipment turn-in site and backup DS maintenance 
Table 2-4. GS Units' Primary Tasks During ODS [Ref. 14, pp. 5-6] 
NOTES: Heavy Equipment Maintenance Company (HEMCO) 
Light Equipment Maintenance Company (LEMCO) 
* Assigned wartime mission 
3. Maintenance Structure 
One major shortcoming in the Army's sustainment maintenance structure is the 
lack of a single organization responsible for managing all of the various organizations/ 
units that are performing sustainment maintenance. The majority of the DOL activities 
and the active component GS maintenance companies are managed by Forces Command 
(FORSCOM). The remaining DOL activities are under the Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC). The Army Materiel Command (AMC) controls all of the Army 
depots. Each of the reserve component elements (NG and USAR) have there own 
headquarters organization (see Figure 2-1). While this non-integrated structure has 
managed to provide adequate maintenance support during peacetime, it has failed 






DA = Department of the Army 
AMC =    Army Materiel Command 
FORSCOM = Forces Command 
TRADOC = Training and Doctrine Command 
OCAR = Office of the Chief of Army Reserves 
NGB = National Guard Bureau 
DOLs = Directorate of Logistics 
GSMUs = General Support Maintenance Units 
(AC) = Active Component 
(RC) = Reserve Component 
Figure 2-1. Sustainment Maintenance Organizations 
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The logistic planners within the U. S Central Command (CENTCOM), the 
command and control element in charge of ODS, were unable to coordinate their 
sustainment maintenance requirements with a single point of contact within the Army. 
Instead, CENTCOM personnel were forced to manage this critical support with the Army 
staff, several Major Army Commands (MACOMs), the National Guard Bureau, and the 
Office of the Chief, Army Reserve (OCAR). [Ref. 2, pp. 1-1 and 1-2] 
One of the primary objectives of ISM is to reduce these problems associated with 
wartime readiness. First, under ISM, there will be exchanges/sharing of information and 
reparable items between the various activities that will be involved in the sustainment 
maintenance. The Centers of Excellence (COE) for the reparable programs will be 
redesignated every one to three years. This will allow the RC units to gain additional 
experience on the force modernization equipment and provide numerous maintenance 
activities capable of repairing these critical components. With this dispersion of 
experience, the sustainment maintenance system should be able to expand production in 
a time of crisis. Second, the ISM concept will provide planners and users of sustainment 
maintenance with a single point of contact (POC) within the Army. The single POC idea 
has not yet been solidified as to who (which agency) should fill the position and what 
their responsibilities/authority will be. Chapter III will discuss this issue. [Ref 2, p. 1-6] 
D.        Budget Reductions 
1.       DOD Budget 
Since 1988, (with the exception of fiscal year 1991 (FY91) due to ODS) the DoD 
budget has been shrinking as measured in both constant dollars and as a percentage of the 
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federal budget (see Figure 2-2). This type of reduction has traditionally cut a larger 
percentage of support (i. e., maintenance units) assets from the force structure than 
combat arms (i. e., infantry, armor, etc.) units. President Clinton's Budgetary Proposal 
for FY96 continues this downward trend. The proposed defense budget for FY96 is $258 
billion. This amount is only two percent more than the FY95 budget of $253 billion. 
This five billion dollar "increase" will not even cover the inflation for next year. The 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the President's defense spending 
proposals will continue to decline through 1997; the proposed increases after that would 
approximately keep pace with inflation. [Ref. 16, p. 22] 
2.        Army Budget 
The Army's budget, like the DoD budget, has experienced some harsh reductions 
as measured in both total obligational authority (TOA) and outlays. Figure 2-3 illustrates 
ten years of negative growth (excluding ODS) for the Army's TOA based on the 
percentage of real growth. A similar situation is shown in Figure 2-4 for the Army's 
outlays. 
The Army budget is subdivided into categories (or appropriations). The five 
major appropriations are: military personnel (MILPERS), operations and maintenance 
(O&M), procurement, research and development (R&D), and military construction 
(MILCON). The need for a revised maintenance concept is even more obvious when one 
examines where, within the budget, the recent reductions have occurred (the O&M, 
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Figure 2-2. Defense as a Percent of Federal Budget (in Current Dollars) [Ref. 17] 
The O&M appropriation is further subdivided into four other groupings called 
budget activities (BA). Table 2-5 provides a description of the types of projects funded 
within these budget activities. 
The procurement appropriation is subdivided into five categories: aircraft, 
missiles, weapons and tracked combat vehicles, ammunition, and other procurements 
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Figure 2-3. Army Real Growth Percentage (TOA FY70 - FY95) [Ref. 18, p. 2.] 
support equipment). [Ref. 18, pp. 40-45] These procurement accounts have seen the 
most severe cuts of the five Army appropriations. 
The FY95 procurement outlays was about one third of FY86 procurement outlays 
measured in constant dollars. The current buying power of the procurement 
appropriation equals the buying power of the "hollow force" of the mid-1970's. [Ref. 19, 
pp. 134-135] The proposed FY96 budget will continue this trend by eliminating $1 
billion from the Army's previously planned procurement fund. [Ref. 16, p. 23] Coupled 
with the reduced acquisitions of more modern and dependable equipment, there have 
been drastic cuts in the O&M arena. Common sense indicates that if the Army's 
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Figure 2-4. Army Real Growth Percentage (Outlays FY70 - FY95) [Ref. 19, pp. 134- 
135.] 
Budget Activities (BA) Description of Funding within the BA 
BA 1 - Operating Forces Finances the day-to-day operations of the minimum 
essential AC force, (i. e., combat units, tactical support, 
base support, and depot maintenance) 
BA 2 - Mobilization Supports strategic mobility requirements, prepositioned 
supplies and equipment, and the Army Reserves 
BA 3 - Training & 
Recruiting 
Finances institutional training and other selected training 
and training support activities. 
BA 4 - Administration & 
Service-wide Activities 
Funds administration, logistics, communications, and 
other Army-wide support functions to secure, equip, 
deploy, transport, sustain, and support forces worldwide. 
Table 2-5. Budget Activities within the O&M Appropriation [Ref. 18, p. 32] 
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provided to at least maintain the current readiness posture. However, the opposite has 
occurred for the O&M appropriation since FY92. Figure 2-5 illustrates the relentless 
budget reductions that have occurred over the last decade. 
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Figure 2-5. Army Outlays by Fiscal Year measured in FY95 Constant Dollars ($ in 
millions) [Ref. 19, pp. 134-135] 
The Army desperately needs a sustainment maintenance system that will provide 
more support to its aging equipment with a proportionally smaller slice of the federal 
budget. ISM is a viable concept to satisfy this need. 
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E.       CONCLUSION 
This chapter has shown that due to the current environment in which the Army 
finds itself, concepts such as ISM can assist tremendously in providing a combat-ready 
military force suited to perform vastly different missions into the 21st century within a 
constraining budget. The next chapter will discuss the centralized management of ISM 
at the national level. 
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m. NATIONAL MANAGERIAL CONTROL OF ISM 
Since the origin of the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) concept, one 
of the most highly controversial and debated issues is who (what agency) should manage 
ISM at the national level. This chapter will outline the agencies that could serve as the 
National Sustainment Maintenance Manager (NSMM), the primary functions/ 
responsibilities of the NSMM, and the organizational structure of the NSMM office. 
A.       INTRODUCTION 
From the beginning, one of the primary objectives of the ISM concept was to 
establish a single manager to centralize workloading and resource management 
responsibilities for the Army's sustainment maintenance. [Ref. 20, p. EX-2] As the ISM 
concept proceeds to be tested, the discussion about the function, structure, and 
management of the NSMM continues. Some ISM participants and stakeholders endorse 
a highly-centralized, hierarchial structure to serve as the NSMM; other parties favor no 
national organization at all. 
Besides the fact that the original ISM "blueprint" called for a centralized manager 
for the Army's sustainment maintenance (SM), it appears justified to have some type of 
NSMM based on the complexity of the ISM theory. As Bolman and Deal explain, the 
complexity of an operation (such as ISM) can be attributed to the extremely complicated 
interactions among different individuals, groups, and organizations. [Ref 21, p. 25] As 
Figure 2-1 illustrated, there are numerous agencies and types of organizations involved 
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with sustainment maintenance. By no means, however, does this identify all of the 
stakeholders affected by ISM. The ISM concept will, directly or indirectly, touch every 
unit and influence the management of nearly all of the equipment within the Army. The 
Strategic Logistics Agency (SLA) stated that 
this [ISM] is not business as usual. It represents a major change in 
sustaining maintenance policy and doctrine requiring major changes in the 
way the Army manages its maintenance operations. [Ref. 12, p. 9] 
B.       AGENCY SELECTION 
1.        Testing Phase 
In addition to the complexity surrounding the NSMM debate, there has been a 
lack of consistency displayed during the ISM development and testing. During ISM 
Proof of Principle (PoP), the role of the NSMM was performed by representatives from 
the Depot Systems Command (DESCOM) [Ref. 20, p. W-2]. DESCOM, prior to its 
inactivation, was a major subordinate command (MSC) under the Army Materiel 
Command (AMC). Its primary mission was to manage the Army's depots and industrial 
base. 
For the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance Expanded (ISM-X) demonstration, 
AMC was tasked with establishing "a management operations cell." [Ref. 2, p. 1-5] The 
cell was created by taking representatives from various MSCs within AMC (i. e., Missile 
Command (MICOM) and Tank automotive & Armaments Command (TACOM)). 
Although the concept by which the cell was created was prudent, the seven NSMM 
personnel were not assembled together at their Rock Island, Illinois, location until three 
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days before the start of the ISM-X demonstration. To further complicate matters, the 
newly formed NSMM cell fell under the control of the Industrial Operations Command 
(IOC), which replaced the DESCOM as the Army's depot manager. The new NSMM 
personnel have been challenged during the ISM-X because the majority of them were not 
involved with ISM prior to their temporary assignment as part of the NSMM staff 
Additionally, the cell has had to define its own role as the demonstration occurs. The 
NSMM is further handicapped by the fact that there was only one region, based in Fort 
Hood, Texas, operational for the majority of the ISM-X. 
2.        Execution Phase 
Due to sundry organizations/agencies (see Figure 2-1 and Table 3-1) involved 
with sustainment maintenance, it is no simple task to reach consensus on an issue as 
intricate as the organization and management of the NSMM. The two most likely major 
Army commands (MACOM) to assume responsibility for the NSMM, assuming there 
will be one, are AMC and Forces Command (FORSCOM). Just within these two 
applicants, there are numerous courses of action (COA) for the Army's senior leadership 
to consider. 
The most obvious agency to perform the function of the NSMM is AMC. AMC's 
mission is "to develop, buy, and maintain material for the Army." Based on the 
widespread effects ISM will have on Army units, both individually and collectively, 
AMC is the logical candidate. After all, its motto is: "From helmets to helicopters, AMC 
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Major Subordinate Commands Separate Reporting Agencies 
Army Research Laboratory (ARL) Army Materiel Command School of 
Engineering and Logistics 
Aviation and Troop Command (ATCOM) Army Materiel Command Europe 
Chemical Biological Defense Command 
(CBDCOM) 
Army Materiel Command Inspector 
General Activity 
Communications Electronic Command 
(CECOM) 
Army Materiel Command Installation & 
Services Activity 
Industrial Operations Command (IOC) Army Materiel Command Field 
Assistance in Science and Technology 
Missile Command (MICOM) Army Materiel Command Management 
Engineering Activity 
Soldier Systems Command (SSCOM) Army Materiel Command Logistic 
Support Activity 
Simulation, Training, & Instrumentation 
Command (STRICOM) 
International Cooperative Programs 
Activities 
Tank automotive & Armaments 
Command (TACOM) 
Intelligence and Technology Security 
Activity 
Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) U. S. Army Research Office 
United States Army Security Assistance 
Command (USASAC) 
U. S. Army Science & Technology Center 
(Europe) 
U. S. Army Logistics Support Element 
U. S. Army Materiel System Analysis 
Activity 
Table 3-1. AMC's Subordinate Agencies [Ref. 22] 
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Supports every soldier in every unit every day." Furthermore, AMC is the best prepared 
agency within the Army to fill the role of the NSMM. The organization 
is big business. It manages inventory accounts worth more than ten 
billion dollars and ranks in business volume with the top ten corporations 
in the United States. It is comprised of more than 70,000 people, working 
at some 300 locations in more than 40 states and half a dozen foreign 
countries. [Ref. 22] 
However, even if AMC were designated as the MACOM to fulfill the 
responsibilities as the NSMM, there remain several issues within AMC that need to be 
resolved. First, who within the huge AMC organization will the NSMM work for? The 
two options currently being considered are that the NSMM would be: (1) under control 
of the IOC or, (2) formed as a separate organization directly under AMC, similar to the 
separate reporting agencies (see Table 3-1). The advantage of option one is that the IOC 
owns the Army depots; however, it is believed that this type of organizational 
arrangement would create too much bureaucracy for the NSMM to function efficiently 
and facilitate timely maintenance repairs. Some personnel perceive this problem 
currently exists within the Army, and the fear is that ISM will fall victim to it if the 
NSMM works for the IOC. 
Option two is promising because a separate organization may facilitate a broader- 
based coordination among the MSCs within AMC when required to resolve a problem. 
However, this alternative would require for a new agency to be formed, and this may be a 
difficult task considering the Army's force structure drawdown. There has also been a 
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proposal to combine these two options, in which the NSMM would be initially placed 
under the IOC but later be realigned to report directly to AMC [Ref. 23]. 
The second issue that AMC needs to resolve prior to assuming the NSMM job is 
how much/what type of control does AMC have over the various activities performing the 
sustainment maintenance? As Figure 2-1 showed, AMC only controls a small portion of 
these maintenance activities. The majority are owned by other MACOMs (FORSCOM, 
TRADOC, OCAR, and NGB). In preparation of being selected as the MACOM to 
oversee the NSMM, AMC has developed six COAs to help resolve this issue. Table 3-2 
outlines the options by showing the ownership of the national, regional, and local 
sustainment maintenance managers (NSMM, RSMM, and LSMM). The COAs range 
from one extreme (AMC owning all sustainment maintenance activities) to another (a 
decentralized ISM structure with no NSMM). The likely outcome will be one (or a 
modification of one) of the middle COAs with memorandums of agreement (MOA) or 
memorandums of understanding (MOU) being signed by the five MACOMs currently 
involved with ISM. These MOAs/MOUs will be required to establish workloading 
prioritization schemes to ensure that essential installation requirements are accomplished 
despite the ISM workload. [Ref. 25, p. 11] 
The only other MACOM that is even remotely being considered to assume 
responsibility for the NSMM is FORSCOM. The reason this option remains a possibility 
is due to the large percentage of sustainment maintenance activities (directorate of 
logistics (DOL) and active component general support maintenance units) under 
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NSMM RSMM LSMM Remarks 
COAX AMC AMC AMC Original concept; AMC mgmt 
structure; AMC owns sustainment 
units 
COA1 AMC AMC MACOM- 
based 
Full-up NSMM; AMC mgmt 
structure at NSMM and RSMM; 
assets remain with warfighters 




Full-up NSMM; Corps assumes 
more control of regions 




Inventory Control Points (ICP) and 
National Maintenance Points 
(NMP) provide national mgmt; 
each RSMM coordinates with each 
ICP 




Limited NSMM (i. e., policy and 
QA standards); regions operate at 
their own direction 




No national management 
Table 3-2. ISM Courses of Action [Ref 24] 
FORSCOM ownership. Although there have been comments made regarding 
FORSCOM relinquishing control/ownership of their DOLs to AMC, it is highly unlikely 
such a transition will ever occur. The warfighting commanders at the installation level 
(i. e., the Commander of III Corps and Fort Hood, Texas) enjoy having the extensive 
repair capabilities of a DOL under their reign in order to help maintain equipment 
readiness. This attitude is somewhat justified when one considers that ISM is only a 
portion of the DOLs' designated mission. As of halfway through the ISM-X 
demonstration, the actual percentage of ISM jobs at each of the participating DOLs 
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varied based on the volume of ISM workorders and locally-generated requirements. At 
Fort Carson's DOL, about 52% of the workorders were ISM jobs [Ref. 26], while only 
approximately 25% of the jobs at the Fort Riley DOL belong to ISM [Ref. 27]. Aside 
form the issue of the ownership of the sustainment maintenance activities, FORSCOM 
offers little other advantages in being chosen as the headquarters responsible for the 
NSMM. 
C.       FUNCTIONS/RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE NSMM 
Assuming that a NSMM will exist, the next issue that needs to be resolved is 
what are the NSMM's functions/responsibilities? Throughout the development and 
testing of ISM, the specified duties of the NSMM have grown. A "crawl, walk, run" 
approach has been applied to this issue. 
1.        Testing Phase 
a.        ISMPoP 
During the PoP, the primary responsibilities assigned to the NSMM were: 
• Assist with definition and execution of the PoP by attending meetings chaired 
by SLA. 
• Serve as AMC's executive agent and provide a "single voice" on ISM 
issues/efforts. 
• Develop/publish standard operating procedures (SOP)/directives to assist 
AMC in executing and assessing the PoP. 
• Develop a NSMM command and control structure. 
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The NSMM focused on the following functions: 
• Allocate annual reparable program. 
• Provide/coordinate depot support to LSMM/RSMM. 
• Coordinate utilization of national maintenance contracts. 
Although the majority of these responsibilities/functions seem quite elementary, they 
were needed to establish the framework for the ISM concept. Keep in mind that the 
concept introduced a radically different way to perform sustainment maintenance, and 
the principle was still in its infancy during the PoP. [Ref. 20, pp. W-3 and W-4] 
b.        ISM-X Demonstration 
As the participants became more familiar with the ISM concept, and as a 
quasi-permanent NSMM staff was formed, the responsibilities/functions grew, both in 
number and complexity. The main responsibilities given to the NSMM by AMC were: 
• Consolidate/distribute sustainment maintenance (SM) requirements to 
optimize the utilization of SM resources. 
• Develop/execute an AMC SM plan. 
• Assist the Corporate Board in resolving inter-MACOM issues. (The Corporate 
Board consists of colonel-level or equivalent representatives from the five 
MACOMs. They meet quarterly, or as needed, to provide oversight of the 
demonstration. [Ref. 2, p. 3-7]) 
• Develop visibility of SM capacity and capabilities. 
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• Identify/evaluate SM costs and provide a centralized system to track the flow 
of funds, cost estimates, actual costs, and assets associated with executing 
national SM programs. 
• Organize/schedule/manage the SM training requirements. 
• Provide a customer service support program which monitors the customers' 
readiness needs and allows feedback from the customers. 
• Develop/disseminate SM policies (Two of the draft policies produced by the 
NSMM are shown in the Appendix). 
The functions of the NSMM during the ISM-X were divided within the ISM-X 
Demonstration Plan into three categories: demonstration, developmental, and long-term. 
These divisions were created for two reasons: (1) An attempt was made to shorten the 
learning curve for the new participants in the NSMM cell, and (2) due to the lack of 
baseline information and/or automated systems, the RAND Corportation could not 
evaluate all of the NSMM functions during the demonstration. The most critical and 
achievable functions were labelled as demonstration functions (DEMO), and were to be 
tested and measured during the demonstration. The developmental functions (DEV) 
were not scheduled to be tested; however, they were to be partially demonstrated and 
analyzed. Finally, the long-term functions (LT) were so dependent on automated systems 
or data that was not available, they were not be to demonstrated. The most significant 
functions are as follows: 
Identify/collect data to be used in SM management (requirements from the 
regions, the MSCs, and other customers; SM capacity and capability; and SM 
costs) (DEMO). 
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• Develop/execute/adjust national workload plan (DEMO). 
• Prepare MOUs/MOAs among ISM-X participants and stakeholders as needed 
(DEMO). 
• Resolve special maintenance problems to include readiness issues above the 
RSMM level (DEMO). 
• Standardize data elements (DEV). 
• Organize/schedule/manage SM training requirements and support to include 
providing wholesale assets down to the retail level for training (DEV). 
• Provide support to the commanders of combined forces, Army forces, and war 
reserve equipment (DEV). 
• Coordinate passback/backlog situations among ISM activities (DEV). 
• Develop/submit input to Army Regulations and Field Manuals (DEV). 
• Establish a cost comparability model (LT). 
• Develop guidelines to balance production versus training requirements to 
maximize readiness (LT). 
• Assist in the development of Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) plans to 
include: Level of Repair Analysis (LORA), Maintenance Allocation Charts 
(MAC), and Source Maintenance Recoverability (SMR) codes (LT). 
• Develop long range SM plans and investment strategies (LT). 
• Prepare to backfill a RSMM in the event of a deployment (LT). 
• Identify opportunities for vertical and horizontal integration of management 
information systems (MIS) (LT). [Ref. 2, pp. 3-3 through 3-7] 
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2.        Transitionmg from Testing to Implementation 
Once the NSMM personnel settled into their newly-formed positions, they started 
to modify their functions. These self-imposed changes resulted due to two factors. First, 
since one of the primary objectives of the ISM-X is to distinguish/clarify the role of the 
NSMM, the staff enhanced its apparent value-added to the ISM concept by defining its 
own purpose. Secondly, assuming a permanent NSMM would be activated as a part of 
the implementation of ISM, the NSMM staff developed an initial Mission and Functions 
(M&F) Document. The M&F outlines nine functions the NSMM will carry out: 
• Develop/manage a data base of the SM activities' capabilities and capacities. 
• Develop/manage a SM contractor data base. 
• Integrate, to a greater extent, the Logistic Support Elements (LSE) into SM. 
• Establish the automated requirements to support ISM. 
• Develop the centralized SM plan from a total Army perspective. 
• Manage the centralized tracking of SM data. 
• Define an effective quality assurance program for SM. 
• Support the development of ILS plans by making recommendations concerning 
LORAs, MACs, and SMRs. 
• Improve customer service for SM participants through system interfaces and 
lines of communication. [Ref. 28, pp. 3-5] 
Although the overall ISM concept is widely-supported by the personnel and 
agencies currently involved, many stakeholders have a great concern over the 
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responsibilities/functions of the NSMM. In particular, several item managers and 
maintenance personnel within TACOM are worried that the centralized SM plan and 
contractor data base will empower the NSMM to the point that the commodity 
commands/MSCs loose the flexibility to manage their items. [Ref. 29] The NSMM 
personnel have stated that this is not their intention. They see themselves, with the SM 
plan and contractor information, in a position to assist the item managers in making wiser 
decisions (make versus buy; repair versus washout; etc.) and saving money (through the 
consolidation of contracts). [Ref. 30] 
From a human resource perspective, the TACOM personnel are justified in their 
concerns regarding their jobs/responsibilities. ISM will require change, and usually 
change is met with opposition. Bolman and Deal identify four issues concerning people's 
reaction to change. Change can 
• Causes people to feel incompetent, needy, and powerless. 
• Creates confusion and unpredictability throughout an organization. 
• Generates conflict. 
• Creates loss. 
In order to minimize the resistance and the subsequent opposition, the concerned 
personnel should be involved with the development of sensitive issues (i. e., the 
structure, management, and responsibilities of the NSMM) and be educated as to the 
effects the personnel are likely to experience in their job. [Ref. 21, pp. 378,381, and 
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397] It was shocking to see the lack of understanding of the ISM concept by some of the 
ISM participants. 
D.       ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE NSMM 
Although the functions/responsibilities of the NSMM are beginning to solidify, 
one major factor that will influence the NSMM's role and relationship to other agencies 
is the NSMMs structure. The NSMM, like any other organization or firm (public or 
private sector), needs to ensure that its structure is consistent and in agreement with the 
organization's goals/objectives/strategies. This is just as important as the need to have 
the firm's goals/objectives/strategies in congruence with the organization's external 
environment. [Ref. 31, p. 19-23] There have been several alternatives considered for 
both the NSMM staff and the overall ISM structure. 
1.        NSMM Staff Structure 
There are two primary organizational structures being reviewed for the NSMM 
staff. Both consist of three functionally organized staff sections under the command of 
the NSMM. Each proposal has the various RSMMs also reporting directly to the 
NSMM. The main differences between the two options is the mission/responsibilities of 
the three staff elements. 
Figure 3-1 illustrates the earlier of the two structures. Overall, this structure 
creates a broader range of functions/responsibilities for the NSMM organization, 
including a resource management section. The draft table of distribution and allowances 
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Figure 3-1. NSMM Organizational Structure - Option One 
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TITLE GRADE RQMT 
NSMM DIRECTORATE 
Commander 0-6 1 
Director GS-15 1 
Secretary GS-6 1 
Office Automation GS-5 1 
NATIONAL SUSTAINMENTMAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT DIVISION 
Chief GS-14 1 
Secretary GS-5 1 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-13 3 
Equipment Specialists GS-12 3 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-11 3 
Production Controller GS-9 3 
OPERATIONSAND TRAINING DIVISION 
Chief GS-13 
Secretary GS-5 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-12 3 
Equipment Specialists GS-12 
Plans Analyst GS-12 
Program Analyst GS-11 
Systems Analyst GS-11 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-9 2 
Maintenance Specialists E-8 
Supply Specialists E-7 
Table 3-3. NSMM TDA - Option One 
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TITLE GRADE RQMT 
POLICY AND RESOURCES DIVISION 
Chief GS-13 1 
Secretary GS-5 1 
Supply Officer W-5 1 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-12 2 
Equipment Specialists GS-12 1 
Computer System Analyst GS-12 2 
Budget Analyst GS-12 1 
Process Analyst GS-12 1 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-11 1 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-9 2 
Table 3-3 (continued). NSMM TDA - Option One 
option, shown in Figure 3-2, decentralizes the resource functions and introduces a 
customer service section. Table 3-4 depicts the 35 personnel TDA for this alternative. 
[Ref. 32] 
2.        Overall ISM Structure 
As with nearly everything else thus far, the exact organizational structure of ISM 
remains undecided. The primary variables involved with the finalization of the structure 
are the number of RSMMs located in the continental United States (CONUS) and the 
number outside the continental United States (OCONUS). The two main factors 
influencing the number of RSMMs are the anticipated demand for ISM repaired items 

































Figure 3-2. NSMM Organizational Structure - Option Two 
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TITLE GRADE RQMT 
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 
Director 0-6 
Civilian Executive Assistant GS-15 
Administration Assistant GS-6 2 
Automation Specialist GS-5 
ASSOCIATE FOR PLANS AND ANALYSIS 
Chief GS-13 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-12 
Equipment Specialists GS-12 
Plans Analyst GS-12 
Budget Analyst GS-12 
Process Analyst GS-12 
Program Analyst GS-11 
ASSOCIATE FOR POLICY AND INTEGRATION 
Chief GS-13 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-12 2 
Equipment Specialists GS-12 
Systems Analyst GS-12 
Computer Systems Analyst GS-11 2 
Table 3-4. NSMM TDA - Option Two 
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TITLE GRADE RQMT 
ASSOCIATE FOR CUSTOMER SERVICE AND OPERATIONS 
Chief GS-14 1 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-13 4 
Equipment Specialists GS-12 3 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-11 3 
Production Controller GS-9 3 
Logistics Management Specialists GS-9 2 
Table 3-4 (continued). NSMM TDA - Option Two 
activities with a region. Considering there are between 75-100 such activities Army- 
wide, the RSMM issue is quite complex. Currently, AMC has not determined precisely 
how many LSMMs are needed to satisfy the Army's SM requirements. This issue is 
further complicated because the capabilities and capacities (C&C) of the various SM 
activities are not currently monitored by any agency within the Army. In the past, each 
MACOM was only concerned with its own C&C. This is further justification to 
implement ISM with a completely-staffed NSMM. Additionally, the reserve components 
(NGB and OCAR) have yet to commit to any specific level of participation in ISM. 
Assuming ISM will be approved, there will be either two or three RSMMs in 
CONUS. If there are two regions, the U. S. will most likely be divided at the Mississippi 
River into an eastern region and a western region. Fort Bragg, North Carolina (XVIII 
Airborne Corps) would manage the eastern RSMM; the western RSMM would be 
assigned to Fort Hood, Texas (in Corps). This appears to be the Army's current plan for 
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CONUS RSMMs. If a third CONUS region were established, III Corps would have the 
central RSMM, while the western RSMM would be at Fort Lewis, Washington (I Corps). 
This option is not likely to occur because the Army has very few active component units 
west of Texas. 
AMC is leaning towards three OCONUS regions, although having only two 
remains an option. If there were three OCONUS RSMMs, they would be located in 
Europe, Korea, and in the Pacific (either Hawaii, Alaska, or Japan). U. S. Army, Europe 
(USAREUR) would manage RSMM Europe; RSMM Far East would be assigned to the 
Eighth U. S. Army (EUSA) in Korea; and U. S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) would 
oversee RSMM Pacific. [Ref. 32] If only two OCONUS regions were activated, it is 
assumed that RSMM Far East and RSMM Pacific would consolidate into one region. 
E.       CONCLUSION 
Although the ISM concept of sustainment maintenance appears to be quite 
beneficial to the Army, the unanswered questions discussed in this chapter must be 
resolved in a timely and accurate manner in order to achieve the potential associated with 
the idea. The quality of the answers to these questions will either "make or break" the 
ISM concept. The subsequent chapter will highlight several of the external issues that 




The preceding chapters-have described the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance 
(ISM) concept, the need for implementation of the concept based on the current budget 
environment, and several of the major, unresolved issues. The current demonstration of 
the concept, ISM-Expanded (ISM-X), concludes on 31 December 1995. Although the 
future for ISM appears promising, the decision to execute the concept Army-wide rests 
with the Army's senior leadership. 
A. IMPLEMENTATION DECISION 
With nine months (April - December 1995) of data from the ISM-X 
demonstration added to the nine months (November 1993 - July 1994) of findings from 
the ISM Proof of Principle (PoP), the verdict moves to the jury. In this case, the jury 
consists of the commanders of the Army Materiel Command (AMC), the Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), and Forces Command (FORSCOM). These three 
generals, with their "12 Stars", will decide the fate of ISM. The "12 Stars" are scheduled 
to rule on ISMs future in January/February 1996. To assist these commanders with their 
ruling, the ISM Corporate Board will make a recommendation concerning whether or not 
to implement the concept, and if so, to what extent. 
B. BARRIERS TO EXECUTION 
Assuming the decision will be to implement ISM, there remain several 
hindrances to the successful execution of the concept. Some of these obstacles are 
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internal to ISM, while others exist within the Army. The following sections will 
highlight several of these barriers to execution. 
1. Act of Implementation 
Considering the relatively successful development/planning and testing phases of 
ISM, the next challenge will be implementation. Unfortunately, the complexity of the 
implementation phase is often underestimated or ignored. Digman states that the 
ultimate effectiveness of a decision is determined by its implementation. He says, "how 
the decision is put into practice is of critical, if not primary, importance." [Ref. 31, 
p. 19-2] Additionally, King and Cleland remarked that 
the greatest difficulties in instituting change do not lie in the design and 
development of the changes themselves. Rather, the greatest obstructions 
to positive change lie in the processes that are used to implement them. 
[Ref. 33, p. 325] 
Hopefully, AMC (assuming they will be the major Army command (MACOM) 
responsible for ISM) will develop a competent implementation team (IT). AMC's 
original plan called for the IT to be formed simultaneously with the National 
Sustainment Maintenance Manager (NSMM) staff. After the completion of the 
implementation, the IT personnel would be absorbed into the NSMM staff. [Ref. 23] 
2. Level of Participation 
The ISM concept relies on the participation from various organizations 
throughout the Army. Without their involvement, the objectives of ISM will not be 
achieved. 
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a. AMC Commodity Commands 
Several of the AMC major subordinate commands (MSC) shown in Table 
3-1 also function as commodity commands. These commands (Aviation and Troop 
Command (ATCOM), Missile Command (MICOM), etc.) are responsible for managing 
specific categories of equipment for the Army. The ISM concept was developed to 
involve any type of equipment that could require sustainment maintenance. During the 
ISM PoP, a number of commodity commands were invited to participate [Ref. 20, pp. 
W-6 through W-10]. However, only the Tank automotive and Armaments Command 
(TACOM) chose to play. This trend has, for the most part, continued through ISM-X. 
NSMM and TACOM personnel are both concerned with the lack of involvement from 
the other commodity commands. Their concern is that ISM will be tailored too much 
toward TACOM, since TACOM has been so immersed with the testing of the concept. It 
is realized that this "isolationist philosophy" will not make Army-wide implementation of 
ISM any easier. [Ref. 7 and 34] 
b. Reserve Components (RC) 
As noted in the previous chapter, the level of participation of the Army 
Reserves and the National Guard has not yet been established. The matter is complicated 
due to the various headquarters involved with RC assets (see Figure 2-1). This 
uncertainty has effects both internal and external to ISM. 
Internally, the level of RC commitment of their sustainment maintenance 
(SM) activities influences the number of regions needed within the United States to 
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successfully manage ISM. The issue also hinders the planning efforts being done to 
establish the appropriate amount of SM capability/capacity within ISM. External to ISM, 
the level of RC participation in ISM is a contributing factor to wartime readiness. After 
all, one of the lessons-learned from Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS) is that the RC 
lacked training on the Army's newer generation equipment/weapon systems. [Ref. 14, 
pp. 2-4] 
3.        Civilian versus Military 
Due to the extreme competitiveness involved with the ISM concept, the majority 
of the SM repairs have been conducted by civilian labor (at the installation Directorate of 
Logistics (DOL)). For example, during the ISM PoP, the 190th Maintenance Company, a 
general support maintenance unit (GSMU), was marginally involved. However, when 
ISM-X began, the 190th was not included and did not contribute to the ISM workload. 
They were omitted because the soldiers (the "Green Suiters") were not as productive as 
their civilian counterparts in the Fort Hood DOL maintenance shop. [Ref. 6] There does 
not appear to be any feasible way to "even the score." The "Green Suiters" are 
handicapped by time-distractors (physical training, police calls/clean up details, 
formations/ceremonies, and other additional duties) as well as older, less sophisticated 
maintenance facilities/equipment in many instances. 
Another advantage the civilian workers have over the soldiers is their job 
stability. While most civilian employees remain in an organization, like a DOL, for ten 
years or more, the military member is required to move every two - four years. This does 
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not include the, sometimes frequent, moves within an unit. Very often, a soldier is 
moved to various positions within the same unit to broaden his/her professional 
experience for future positions and promotions. Based on the higher turnover rate, a 
soldier will probably never acquire the same level of proficiency as a civilian worker. 
An additional problem for the "Green Suiter" is the Army's personnel system. 
The Army believes that the same military occupational skill (MOS) categories, 63H 
(track-vehicle mechanic) and 63W (wheel-vehicle mechanic), can successfully perform 
at both the direct support (DS) level of maintenance as well as the general support (GS) 
level. As Table 1-1 illustrates, GS maintenance is more detailed than DS level. The 
soldiers in a DS maintenance shop are often thought of as "parts changers." However, 
these same soldiers could be reassigned to a GSMU where they are expected to know 
how to "repair" the same components they were only permitted to "change" before. 
Although there are very few opportunities for a 63H/W to be assigned to a GSMU, no 
one should anticipate that the soldier can match the efficiency of a civilian mechanic. 
4.        ISM Automation 
The number one issue of concern for the managers at the local, regional, 
national, and commodity command levels is automation. Although the Executive 
Management Information System (EMfS) designed to support ISM is performing 
adequately (with several upgrades/modifications during the ISM PoP and ISM-X), the 
total automation environment is not satisfying the users. Many managers believe that the 
current systems being used within the Army's maintenance and supply arenas are not 
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integrated enough. One common criticism is the lack of asset visibility. Item managers 
at the commodity commands are forced to manually update their automated records via 
telephone conversations with the local sustainment maintenance managers (LSMM). To 
date, the item managers' system can not directly receive current maintenance status 
concerning their job-ordered equipment submitted at the SM activities. This 
shortcoming, though, does not exist between the item managers and the depots. These 
two parties are integrated via the depots' automation system. There appears to be 
resistance in modifying the depots' system, which is older technology, to accommodate 
ISM participants. From an efficiency standpoint, the ISM automation/management 
information system (MIS) needs serious review prior to Army-wide fielding of ISM. 
However, it must also be noted that most people are never totally satisfied with their 
automation capabilities. [Ref. 6, 7,26,27,29, 30,34, and 38, pp. 11-15] 
5.        Single Stock Fund (SSF) 
Another Army initiative developed concurrently with ISM was the Single Stock 
Fund concept. Under this program, the Army would consolidate its current supply 
system, which includes two levels (wholesale and retail), into one fund. This idea has 
been discussed within the government for several years. The General Accounting Office 
(GAO) recommended the SSF in 1990 as a possible solution to the Army's excess 
inventory problem. The GAO reports that the Army needs a system to provide greater 
visibility of inventory assets and provide a means to redistribute excessive inventory. 
[Ref. 35, pp. 2-5] 
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In a subsequent report, GAO again suggested SSF as a partial solution to two 
other inventory-related issues. First, under the two levels of supply, there is a "disparity 
between the amount of credit given [for the returning of a serviceable or unserviceable 
part] to units by the retail stock fund and the amount of credit received from the 
wholesale stock fund." Secondly, the Army has been guilty of repairing components at 
the installation level, which is part of the retail system, that are in long supply (a high 
quantity of a specific item relative to its rate of usage) at the wholesale level. Both of 
these problems contribute to an inefficient use of the Army's scarce Operation and 
Maintenance (O&M) dollars. [Ref. 36, pp. 2-10] 
Under the SSF concept, AMC would assume ownership of all secondary assets 
down to the installation level. Additionally, the two levels of stocks would be merged 
under a national item manager. The goals of SSF are to "reduce inventories, 
procurement investments, and costs of providing secondary items." The SSF has 
completed a PoP, like ISM, and has verified that potential savings and efficiencies can be 
achieved with the concept. However, the SSF concept is not as close to possible 
implementation as ISM. It appears that the SSF concept will be more expensive to 
introduce Army-wide then earlier anticipated. This funding issue, coupled with the 
shrinking DoD budget, has caused the SSF concept to be refined prior to Army-wide 
fielding. [Ref. 37, p. 15] 
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
In addition to the various subjects presented in the previous section of this 
chapter, future research could examine the actual cost avoidance/saving of the ISM 
concept. After the completion of ISM-X, there should be a tremendous amount of data to 
facilitate additional research. It would be interesting to see if the initial benefits 
discovered with ISM continue as the concept matures. One observation mentioned in the 
ISM PoP after action report is that 
maintenance, supply, and transportation personnel [involved with the PoP] 
were instructed up front to prioritize anything with an ISM sticker on it. 
Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) were established for ISM and 
installation procedures were basically idled. In essence, ISM was tested in 
a tailored environment, so the associated data collected during the PoP 
had to be skewed to some degree. To have real world results, you have to 
test the real world. Be aware of the Hawthorne Effect'. [Ref. 39, p. 9] 
D. CONCLUSION 
Even though the ISM concept still has some serious unresolved issues, it appears 
to be a maintenance system that can greatly benefit the Army and possibly other services 
within DoD. This author recommends that ISM be approved for Army-wide 
implementation in 1996, with a fully-staffed NSMM under the direct command and 
control of AMC. 
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APPENDIX. ISM POLICIES 
This Appendix contains two draft policies prepared by the National Sustainment 
Maintenance Manager (NSMM) during the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance 
Expanded (ISM-X). The first policy outlines the procedures to be followed when non- 
repaired equipment must be passed from one source of repair (SOR) activity to another. 
The second policy describes the necessity of disposition instructions for items to be 
repaired under the ISM concept. 
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April 6,1995 
NSMM Policy 1-1 
MAINTENANCE 
Subject: General Support (GS) Passback 
Policy: 
1. Repair of GS passback will be accomplished in compliance with existing GS 
Technical Manual series 34, Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) and/or 
Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) repair standards. Repairs requiring 
maintenance above the GS standards will be referred to the Major Subordinate 
Command (MSC) for disposition. When a Source Of Repair (SOR) has determined a 
passback situation exists, it is the responsibility of the SOR Local Sustainment 
Maintenance Manager (LSMM) to elevate the passback to the Regional Sustainment 
Maintenance Manager (RSMM). If the RSMM can not satisfy the passback 
requirement within the region, the RSMM is to elevate the requirement to the 
National Sustainment Maintenance Manager (NSMM). The NSMM will recommend 
the SOR to satisfy the passback requirement. 
2. When passback requirements are performed within the region, the financial 
management processes shall be the same as inter-installation billing and 
reimbursement procedures used for Center of Excellence (COE) workloading. 
3. When passback is between RSMM and NSMM, the Installation Resource Manager 
ofthat installation will provide a Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) 
to the NSMM. The NSMM will initiate action to provide a funded Procurement Work 
Directive (PWD) for the alternate SOR. 
4. The MtPR/PWD will be the authorizing documents used to define precisely the 
quantity of items, the unit or program costs, projected time frames, level of repair, and 
property accountability procedures. 
5. GS Passback repair will be subject to a 30 day warranty after the item has been put 
into service. 
Figure A-l. Draft General Support Passback Policy for ISM 
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Discussion: 
1. GS Passback is defined as that workload which is beyond SOR capacity, non- 
mission capable maintenance (NMCM), and forecasted backlog. The regions shall be 
offered a fair priced (commensurable with GS level repair standards) passback 
program to satisfy sustainment maintenance backlog generated at an echelon lower 
than depot maintenance. Items may have a maintenance repair code "D", for which 
the scope of work specifically requests a repair to GS standards. GS standards are 
normally identified in Technical Manuals, TM-34, AVM and/or OEM. GS Passback 
is generated from the overflow of forecasted backlog and/or NMCM items impacting 
the readiness of a unit to perform its assigned mission. Backlog is one of many factors 
used by the Directorate of Logistics (DOLs), Combined Support Maintenance Shops 
(CSMSs), and General Support Units (GSUs) for forecasting annual budget and 
workload requirements. 
Requirement: Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) directed 
Proponents: AMSMC-PD (NSMM) 
Original Signed 
Dick Hawotte 
National Sustainment Maintenance Manager 
Figure A-l (continued). Draft General Support Passback Policy for ISM [Ref. 7] 
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April 18,1995 
NSMM Policy 1-2 
ADMINISTRATION 
Subject: Disposition Policy 
Policy: 
Center of Excellence (COE) installations are not to be considered as storage 
activities. Transportation, shipping, and special instructions (i. e., short term staging) 
will be included in the Feasibility To Repair Request. Assets held over 30 days 
pending shipping instructions will incur staging and handling costs. Special programs 
(i. e., ship forward) requirements, procedures, duration, and cost will be included in 
scope of work (SOW). Changes in shipping instructions to meet customer 
requirements can be negotiated to include funding adjustments to the MEPR. SOW 
will also include instructions for disposal of residue of repair programs. 
Discussion: 
The objective of the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance Management 
program is to reduce maintenance costs. This objective is achieved by reducing actual 
repair cost, repair cycle times, and order and ship times. Many programs being 
worked at the COEs are repair and return programs. Early in the program, some 
SOWs were processed with shipping instructions as "to be determined." Failure to 
respond quickly to requests for shipping instructions has caused handling, staging, and 
storage problems at some local repair sites in the region. The purpose of this policy is 
to require disposition instructions or any special program requirements in the 
Feasibility To Repair Request, so all parties understand total program requirements 
and costs up front. The ability to move assets quickly after completion of repair is an 
integral part of the Integrated Sustainment Maintenance Management concept. 
Requirement: Integrated Sustainment Maintenance (ISM) directed 
Proponents: AMSMC-PD (NSMM) 
Original Signed 
Dick Hawotte 
 National Sustainment Maintenance Manager 
Figure A-2. Draft Disposition Policy for ISM [Ref. 7] 
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